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Who we are

Members of the research project are...




Francesca Brencio is Associate Researcher at the Research Group "FilosofĂ­a Aplicada: Sujeto, Sufrimiento, Sociedad" at the University of Seville (Spain), and member of The Collaborating Centre for Values-based Practice at the S. Catherine College at the University of Oxford (UK). She leads the Pheno-Lab, A Theoretical Laboratory on Philosophy and Mental Health. She also works as a philosophical counselor.
More info at:
https://us.academia.edu/FrancescaBrencio
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Francesca-Brencio




Susi Ferrarello, is associate professor at California State University, East Bay. She has a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the Sorbonne in Paris, a master’s in Human Rights and Political Science from the University of Bologna. Among her books, The Ethics of Love (Routledge, 2023), Human Emotions and the Origin of Bioethics (Routledge, 2021), Husserl's Ethics and Practical Intentionality (Bloomsbury, 2015). She writes for Psychology Today and also works as a philosophical counselor.
More info at:
https://www.csueastbay.edu/directory/profiles/phil/ferrarellosusi.html
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/lying-the-philosophers-couch
https://csueastbay.academia.edu/SusiFerrarello





Pierrick Simon is a french independent philosophy researcher specialized in phenomenology and in philosophy as a way of life. He focuses on the potential of philosophy for therapy and happiness. For this purpose, he studies mindfulness, spiritual exercises, and remedies to toxic political polarization.
More info at: 





Lucienne Spencer is a Postdoctoral Researcher in Mental Health Ethics at the University of Oxford. She is working on a Wellcome Trust project investigating the underlying mechanisms of psychological therapy for anxiety and depression in young people, led by Prof Ilina Singh and Prof Argyris Stringaris. Her research interests include phenomenology, epistemic injustice, and the philosophy of psychiatry. Her website is https://luciennespencer.com 
More info at: 




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